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TEACHING ELECTION LAW TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 
BRUCE E. CAIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The modern incarnation of election law is a cross-pollinated field in 
several senses.  Although there was at least one earlier Election Law 
casebook1, the field really blossomed after Baker v. Carr.2  Because the Court 
essentially lowered (some might say abandoned) the threshold for judicial 
involvement in “political questions,”3 state and federal courts at many levels 
became players in the reform arena.  The Court’s new openness to playing 
referee and last resort line-drawer in redistricting cases coincided with a 
parallel flurry of post-Watergate reform activity in the areas of campaign 
finance, transparency, and lobbying that was nurtured by the political 
incentives of divided government in the 1970s.4  The struggle over the 
meaning and implementation of these efforts spilled into the courts.  As the 
push for political reform continues, the volume of litigation swells also, adding 
ever more cases to the Election Law curriculum. 
Political scientists were drawn into election law because many of the legal 
determinations hinged on empirical facts:5 (for example, measurements of 
racial polarization levels, the impact of political funding patterns on legislation 
and elections, and the size of the residual vote in election administration 
disputes).  Political regulation, however, also intersects with the study of 
government in other ways.  Although it has not always been so clear to either 
political scientists or legal scholars, election law draws on democratic theory 
 
* Heller Professor of Political Science and Executive Director of the University of California 
Washington Center in Washington, D.C. 
 1. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1199, 1201–02 (1999) (citing FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, A COLLECTION OF 
LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1871)). 
 2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Election Law at Puberty: 
Optimism and Words of Caution, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1100 (1999). 
 3. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–11. 
 4. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1267 (1974). 
 5. I discuss this further in Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s 
Perspective, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1118–19 (1999). 
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as much as empirical findings, as reformers frequently invoke high-minded 
goals such as equality of representation or political legitimacy to justify their 
proposals. 
To his credit, Professor Lowenstein was the earliest proponent of a 
legal/political science partnership.  This was reflected from the beginning in 
his casebook, Election Law, by the inclusion of political science materials 
along with the cases themselves and attending commentary notes.6  I audited 
his Election Law course in the eighties to learn more about the law, and was 
pleasantly surprised and impressed by the way he related materials from the 
two disciplines to give background to the cases and to frame their meaning for 
the political system.  At the time, since redistricting was the biggest topic in 
election law, a number of political scientists—myself, Bernie Grofman, Dick 
Engstrom—were involved as expert witnesses in political and racial 
redistricting cases.  Daniel Lowenstein himself had hands-on election law 
experience as the first Chair of the Fair Political Practices Commission.7  So 
from the onset, Election Law was also cross-pollinated in a second sense, 
combining practitioners and scholars.  Despite different backgrounds and 
training, it meant that the lawyers and political scientists shared some common 
experiences with cases and disputes.  The Law and Politics group of the 
American Political Science Association (“APSA”) and the Election Law 
Journal have fostered these cross-pollinations self-consciously. 
But teaching Election Law to political scientists remains a challenge, 
outside of the growing but still limited number of joint Ph.D.-J.D. scholars the 
field is currently producing.  The joint degree phenomenon is a welcome 
development in many ways, but it is not a practical way to educate the many 
other political scientists, or for that matter, lawyers whose work will touch on 
election law issues, or the many undergraduates who could profit by 
understanding the constitutional framework for political regulation.  A truly 
cross-disciplinary approach to teaching Election Law must expose the law or 
political science student to the framework of the other discipline.  That is not a 
simple matter, but also not impossible. 
In this short Essay, I will elaborate on some of the challenges of teaching 
Election Law across disciplinary boundaries, and recommend some guidelines 
gleaned from my own teaching experiences.  In the end, I believe that 
Lowenstein’s basic dual approach is the best, but it involves trading off some 
of the depth and technicality usually involved in graduate training.  But cross-
 
 6. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS xviii (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the interdisciplinary nature of the textbook). 
 7. Daniel Hays Lowenstein: Biography, UCLA SCH. LAW, http://www.law.ucla.edu/facul 
ty/all-faculty-profiles/emeritiprofessors/Pages/daniel-hays-lowenstein.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 
2012). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] TEACHING ELECTION LAW TO POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 727 
disciplinary exposure might promote a deeper view about regulatory strategy 
and doctrines. 
I.  CROSSING THE DISCIPLINARY DIVIDE 
Social scientists and lawyers are trained to think differently.  Political 
scientists look to identify patterns and causes, testing theories with data and 
focusing on the central tendencies rather than dwelling on the specifics of 
individual cases.  What political scientists cannot explain as a statistical 
regularity falls into an error term that is commonly assumed to consist of 
random factors.  Legal thinking elevates elements of the error term to a higher 
level of importance; a particular case fact or nuance can make all the difference 
between decisions falling one way or the other.  In theory, and sometimes in 
practice, these complementary perspectives can work in a symbiotic fashion. 
Political scientists and legal scholars also draw on different literatures 
when they look at election law problems.  The former will know a lot about the 
relevant empirical literature or theories of representation, but little or nothing 
about the court rulings or related law review commentary.  A few years ago, 
one of my distinguished peers gave a featured talk about campaign finance 
reform at the annual APSA meeting, urging the political science community to 
advocate for curbing independent spending by the political parties and 
enforcing mandatory public financing to restore political competition, unaware 
at the time of the legal constraints on his ideas.  He was quite surprised when I 
told him that many of his ideas were likely unconstitutional. 
I was reminded of this divide at a recent Law and Politics dinner that 
placed me at the same table with several young election law scholars.  The 
political scientists enthusiastically described at length game theoretic models 
of political competition and multivariate equations that explained the 
measurable effects of Citizens United.8  At the other end of the table sat a 
former Yale Law Journal Editor and Supreme Court Clerk writing about the 
different venue options in redistricting cases.  As they described their work to 
one another, I wondered how much each understood and appreciated what the 
other was doing.  If the election law field is going to thrive, they will need to. 
When I have taught from the leading Election Law casebooks to political 
science graduate students, I have found that they get impatient at wading 
through all the case detail even though, of course, the cases are substantially 
edited.  Many of them lack the rudimentary foundations in constitutional law 
and need to be given some instruction on legal concepts such as strict scrutiny, 
compelling state interests, and narrowly tailored remedies in order to 
understand the Court’s way of thinking about the constitutionality of different 
political reforms.  But if you can quell the political science graduate students’ 
 
 8. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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initial rebellion, they come to see that the courts deal with fascinating 
problems, and that what looks simple and easy to generalize from five miles up 
in the quantitative intellectual skies, looks perplexing and complicated at the 
legal ground level.  Having a mixed class of lawyers and political scientists is 
useful in that regard, because I can turn to the law students to get a reliable 
distillation of the cases whereas the political scientists tend to get overwhelmed 
by the story and sometimes miss the bottom line significance of what they are 
reading.  Too many law students can also be a problem because they tend to 
dominate the legal discussion, being more at home with case materials. 
Problems arise in the other direction, of course, when attention turns to the 
relevant empirical findings.  As in economics, the technical barriers to political 
science research have risen, and people who wield these methodological 
hammers like to dwell on the minutiae of their applications or the possibility of 
applying alternative and usually ever more sophisticated techniques.  It would 
be helpful if lawyers contemplating a career in election law would take 
elementary statistics courses just as it would be better for the political scientists 
to take Constitutional Law, but neither handicap is fatal.  The important 
takeaway is an understanding of the basic research design and bottom line 
findings.  Which estimation procedure is used and why is most often a 
secondary or tertiary issue. 
To achieve the dual goals of helping the law students understand how 
political science research is conducted and not overwhelming them at the same 
time, I try to include both empirical studies and overview articles.  My favorite 
empirical articles for the purpose of demonstrating the empirical method are 
those that try to measure the impact of campaign money on election outcomes 
and policy.9  They nicely illustrate how simple intuitions (for example, money 
obviously corrupts) can be misleading (donations typically go to those who are 
already supporters and evidence of influences on votes are clearer with 
narrower, technical issues).10  They also illustrate such issues as two-way 
causation and the need to look over time, as well as cross-sectional data.11  
Increasingly there are nice overviews of literatures, some of which have been 
done by legal scholars.  These are better for a macroscopic look at the 
literature. 
 
 9. Some of these literatures are vast and have conflicting results.  It is helpful to find 
articles that sift through the various studies such as Douglas D. Roscoe & Shannon Jenkins, A 
Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions’ Impact on Roll Call Voting, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 52 
(2005). 
 10. See, e.g., W. P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money 
and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W. POL. Q. 478 (1982). 
 11. One of the first and still classic discussions of the two way causation problem, which 
when corrected leads to different results, is Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending 
in Congressional Elections, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 469 (1978). 
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A more fundamental divide is between the different norms of inquiry in 
legal scholarship and social science.  For the social scientist, the prevailing 
professional ethos is the impartial pursuit of facts, updating and altering 
theories in a Bayesian manner as the weight of evidence builds in one direction 
or the other.  For the lawyer, evidence is assessed in an adversarial framework, 
highlighting confirming evidence and downplaying disconfirming evidence.  
Arguments in a legal brief are often lined up like supplicants in a royal court.  
If the judge does not accept the first one, he or she is asked to consider another, 
even if it is inconsistent with the first. 
This can be a serious problem for those political scientists who agree to be 
an expert witness.  “Coaching” sessions before depositions or trial testimony 
can be tense as social science experts, by training and instinct, want to tell 
judges everything they know about a given subject, while the lawyers try to 
keep them harnessed within the core arguments.  Social science research 
articles are meant to assess empirical evidence dispassionately, and journal 
referees are all too eager to punish by rejection those who claim more than 
they have truly proved.  The hedged conclusions that finally appear in these 
articles can come back to haunt the expert witness, which makes the whole 
judicial activity seem even more harrowing. 
Another critical difference between legal and political science is the 
greater comfort legal scholars have with moving from the empirical to the 
normative or vice versa.  Not particularly to our credit as a field, political 
science has largely quarantined normative discussion to the subfield of 
“Political Theory,” and much of that enterprise is about writing intellectual 
history rather than creating new concepts.  Most empirical studies are 
motivated by an opportunity to advance the literature, such as a new way to 
measure or conceptualize a previous finding or conventional generalization.  
Normative considerations, if they make it to print at all, are tacked onto the end 
of the article, almost as a chagrined afterthought.  Deriving empirical questions 
from normative questions or policy debates is less frequent and garners fewer 
professional rewards. 
Legal scholarship is much more normative and policy-oriented to begin 
with, and more likely than a political science article to take the broader, more 
synthetic view.  I once gave a lecture on the Voting Rights Act to social 
scientists at a prestigious neighboring research university that was greeted with 
astonishment because a section of my talk discussed the law’s normative value 
as opposed to purely looking at related behavioral issues.  Undergraduate 
students are more comfortable with this unholy mix, because they have not yet 
been trained to think otherwise or socialized to feel guilty when they stray 
from what can be rigorously measured towards the “squishier” questions of 
justice or fairness. 
Political science’s failure in this regard has opened up opportunities for 
other fields.  Policy schools have assumed this chore with respect to 
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government programs and budgeting.  Legal scholars have filled the gap on 
institutional design as evidenced by the work of Ned Foley, Dan Tokaji, and 
Richard Hasen on election administration,12 Heather Gerken on democracy 
assessments,13 and Rick Pildes and Sam Issacharoff on political competition14 
(just to cite a few examples).  I hope that the Election Law classes that I teach 
encourage political scientists to loosen their professional straightjacket just a 
bit, and engage in these types of questions more often in the future. 
II.  SILO-ING AND THE COHERENCE OF THE ELECTION LAW FIELD 
As academic fields develop, scholars inevitably choose to specialize more.  
Expertise extends vertically as the requirements of understanding and 
contributing to a subject grow with each new case and scholarly article.  This 
trend is quite apparent in political science, as evidenced by the number of new 
officially recognized APSA subfields.15  Coupled with the lack of professional 
incentives to look across subjects in a synthetic way, academic specialties tend 
to grow apart like solar systems in an expanding universe.  To their credit, the 
political scientists and legal scholars in the election law field to date have 
tended to work in several subject areas.  But it is not clear whether there is any 
framework that pulls this all together.  To put it another way, how do we 
convey to students that Election Law is anything other than a collection of 
election-related cases that have been decided by the Supreme Court? 
In my approach, I have tried to place Election Law within the larger 
context of political reform and regulation.  Narrowly conceived, Election Law 
covers only the disputes over political regulations and institutions that happen 
to be decided by the courts, whereas the entire political reform spectrum 
includes all legislative, direct democracy, and constitutional attempts at 
democratic improvement.  Court rulings and logic have dramatically shaped 
U.S. political efforts at reform.  The fact, for instance, that an appearance of 
quid pro quo corruption, but not political inequity, is a valid compelling state 
purpose that justifies important political speech and association rights 
 
 12. E.g., Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, 
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of 
Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 937 (2005); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention 
in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007). 
 13. E.g., HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS 
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009). 
 14. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political 
Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999). 
 15. See APSA Organized Sections, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N., http://www.apsanet.org/content_ 
4596.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
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limitations16 has both limited the range of options open to political reformers 
and incentivized campaign finance advocates to reframe as many democratic 
harms as they plausibly can as “corrupt.”  This may explain to some degree 
why the public believes corruption is rampant in government, even though 
politics is by any conceivable measure less corrupt than it used to be.17 
But causation flows in the other direction—from the political system to the 
courts—as well.  Constitutional conventions are for political reasons 
essentially no longer viable pathways for political reform in the modern era.18  
Groups are sophisticated venue shoppers, avoiding forums that will lead to 
likely defeat and opting for those with a higher prospect for success.  As a 
consequence, state courts are seeing more amendments to state constitutions 
that test the boundaries of the revision doctrine that was meant to protect 
against fundamental rule changes motivated by political advantage.  It is 
important for Election Law students to see the influence and pressures that 
both flow into and emanate from the courts, and not view Election Law as 
isolated judicial doctrine. 
Moreover, Election Law strictly conceived only touches on the front end of 
representation—that is, the selection of elected officials—and relegates the 
back end to legislative law.  Topics like lobbying reform, conflict of interest 
regulation, and open meeting laws are not strictly speaking about elections.  
But lobbyists often chair fund-raising committees and bundle individual 
contributions for elected officials.  Conflict of interest logic has seeped into the 
approaches that reforms like McCain-Feingold have taken to campaign 
finance.19  And transparency expands on all fronts for similar democratic 
justifications.  There are sensible reasons to divide the labor between the 
electoral and legislative realms, but this disconnection is increasingly 
problematic in an era of continuous partisan contestation, in which electoral 
and legislative strategies are commonly fused.  This is yet another advantage of 
putting the field in the broader political science framework of political 
regulation. 
 
 16. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–05 (2010) (reaffirming that 
political inequity is not a compelling state interest); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) 
(holding that preventing the appearance of corruption can be a compelling state interest). 
 17. See Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, In Abramoff Case, Most See Evidence of Wider 
Problem, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at A07. 
 18. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State 
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (2009). 
 19. Bruce E. Cain, More or Less: Searching for Regulatory Balance, in RACE, REFORM, 
AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 263, 268 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. 
Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011). 
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III.  THE PLACE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY IN ELECTION LAW 
As election law has moved from a purely rights-based approach towards a 
more structural viewpoint, it has become more obvious than ever before that 
there has to be a clear, more explicit consideration of the democratic goals 
underlying reform proposals.20  Political reform aims to achieve democratic 
improvement.  Clarifying what goals these proposals are meant to achieve is an 
important step in truly improving the U.S. political system.  It is important to 
expose students not only to fundamental democratic theory, but also to the 
intermediate theories that fill in the gaps of the democratic architecture. 
Given the demands of working in the cases as well as the empirical studies, 
it is hard to give this subject its due consideration.  I have used Robert Dahl’s 
A Preface to Democratic Theory21 as one of the initial readings because it 
makes two important points that apply to reform: first, that the critical feature 
of any democratic state is the opportunity for a free election in which voters 
can choose between at least two candidates or party slates.22  Not only does 
this give the students a sense of what is absolutely fundamental to all 
democracies, but it also shows that the basic architecture of a democracy is 
quite bare.  Lots of the other varied features in different democracies—whether 
to have political parties, how to count ballots and decide winners, the level of 
transparency, whether to give voters an initiative option, and the like—are all 
equally compatible with the basic requirements of a democracy. 
This is important because there is a tendency in all of us to think that the 
reform we prefer will make the system “more democratic.”  A few years ago, a 
number of political scientists and legal scholars were vigorously advocating for 
multiparty systems and proportional representation rules, suggesting that more 
choice equaled more democracy.23  Having more than two parties or candidates 
on a ballot might indeed be a welcome change in America today at some or all 
levels of government, but it does not make the system more democratic.  It 
simply replaces one form of democracy with another, each with its advantages 
and disadvantages. 
This leads to a second point: that many of the various theories about 
representation are what have been called “intermediate democratic theories.”24  
Dahl himself contrasts two very important variations in his seminal book.  One 
is the Madisonian strand that divides power and blends the perspectives of the 
 
 20.  For further discussion, see id. 
 21.  ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (expanded ed., 2006). 
 22. See id. at 3 (“But at a minimum . . . democratic theory is concerned with processes by 
which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high level of control over their leaders.”). 
 23. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES: HOW PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2002). 
 24. A term I borrow from Daniel H. Lowenstein.  See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political 
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 784–85 (1985). 
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majority and minority.25  The other is populism that privileges the majority at 
all stages of democratic design.26  This distinction is very helpful in 
understanding why equally well-intentioned reformers might disagree about 
what they are trying to do.  There are ongoing, non-terminating debates about 
the relative merits of representative versus direct democracy, delegate versus 
trustee forms of representation, deliberative versus market-based competition 
and the like.  The challenge is how to expose students to these various 
variations within the confines of a one semester course.  My preference has 
been to give them an overview lecture on this topic rather than try to assign 
lots of additional readings.  But my overriding point is that given the normative 
and policy orientation of the election law field, I have always made it a priority 
to include a segment on democratic theory about reform goal considerations to 
provide a context for what is being contested in the courts. 
IV.  TEACHING ELECTION LAW 
It is not just inevitable, but quite possibly a good thing, that Election Law 
is taught in different ways.  A class itself often has different purposes given the 
different expectations and backgrounds of the students.  Some might be 
looking to make this their career focus while others are just sampling out of 
casual interest.  The political scientist is naturally going to put Election Law in 
a broader political context than law professors who are trying to give students 
vocational skills and background.  Going forward, I would hope that some of 
this material filters down into undergraduate education, because in the end, 
voters directly or indirectly make the choices about political reform that 
sometimes end up in the courts. 
 
  
 
 25. See DAHL, supra note 21, at 4. 
 26. See id. at 34–35. 
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